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The role of individual variable pay in a collectivistic
culture society: an evaluation
Ivana Nacinovic Braje , Maja Klindzic and Lovorka Galetic
Department of Organization and Management, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of
Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
ABSTRACT
With increasing worldwide use of individual variable pay (IVP) and
thereby some theoretical suggestions to drop it in collectivistic
societies it is worth examining the role of variable pay in such
cultural surroundings. This paper aims at answering the following
research questions: what kind of IVP systems are offered in col-
lectivistic societies, is the implementation of IVP systems related
to some specific company characteristic and what results can
companies achieve by using IVP systems. A primary research of
compensation practices was conducted among 58 Croatian
medium and large companies. The research carried out shows
that in Croatia, which is a highly collectivistic society, companies
offer IVP such as pay for performance, sales commissions and
occasional bonuses to its employees. Non-parametric testing has
shown that the use of individual-based pay for performance is
dependent upon the size and ownership structure of the com-
pany. However, contrary to some previous findings and expecta-
tions, our analysis reveals only minor differences in organisational
outcomes between companies that apply or do not apply individ-
ual incentives. Research results support the thesis of global con-
vergence of compensation practices and show that collectivistic
heritage does not inhibit the implementation of IVP.
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Compensation is a key element of the employment relationship and, in addition to
being the single greatest operating cost for many organisations, it has been suggested
as a tool for enhancing organisational performance and sustained competitiveness
(e.g., Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Hansen, 1997; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw,
1998; Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). Compensation choices are many but it usually
incorporates three major components: 1) salaries/wages, the direct payment to the
worker in exchange for competently performing assigned work, 2) incentive payments
(including bonuses) made to the worker for high level of individual or group
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performance and 3) benefits, a combination of legally mandated costs (e.g., different
forms of insurance offered to employees) and other non-wage compensation (e.g.,
company approved benefits like childcare, company loans, education and training
opportunities, etc.) that figure in the total cost of compensating a given employee.
There is a high level of awareness as well as documentation of the differences in both
human resources management and compensation management among countries (Schuler
& Rogovski, 1998; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998). Since compensation practices are strongly
related to work values and to other macro-environmental phenomena, national culture
has been identified among sources of such cross-national variations in compensation pol-
icy and strategy (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991; Laurent,
1986; Newman & Nollen, 1996; Schuler & Rogovski, 1998; Stone & Stone-Romero, 2008;
Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004; Townsend, Scott, & Markham, 1990). Wages, other compensa-
tion, and the ratio of the two, are all significantly affected by cultural affiliation
(Townsend, Scott, & Markham, 1990). Furthermore, differences in culturally based values
may be expected to influence individual reactions to perceptions about the work environ-
ment such that employees may be more motivated and satisfied by a particular compensa-
tion practice simply because it is consistent with their values (Lam, Schaubroeck, &
Aryee, 2002). A mismatch between compensation strategies and cultural characteristics
could result in a number of dysfunctional consequences for employers such as difficulty
in attracting and retaining workers, higher labour costs, labour relation problems, viola-
tion of personal norms leading to resentment and even possibly destructive employee
behaviour, inability to achieve strategic objectives, lower morale and a negative public
image (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991).
However, with globalisation and the growing importance of multinationals since
the mid-1980s, there has been a noticeable trend towards worldwide convergence in
reward strategies, which has been dominated by the impact of the United States prac-
tices (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991; Kressler, 2003; Poutsma, Ligthart, &
Schouteten, 2005). In Europe this influence was first observed in the United
Kingdom and later continued its advance eastwards and southwards (Kressler, 2003).
More specifically, globalisation of reward strategies represents what can be described
as Americanisation (Kressler, 2003) or Anglo-Saxonisation (Poutsma, Ligthart, &
Schouteten, 2005) since many countries partly withdrew from their traditional reward
structures and adopted “Western world” approaches, namely compensation strategies
based on the extensive usage of short- and long-term incentive compensation.
However, many authors argue that practices that might work in the U.S.A., the most
individualistic society in the world, may not work in other countries (Hofstede,
1983), so the attempts to export Western practices to other nations whose national
culture is incompatible with such practices are likely to fail (Hodgetts & Luthans,
1993; Gomez-Mejia & Palich, 1997). The research on the effectiveness of such
“exported” compensation practices (as described by Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne,
1991) to different national settings outside the Western world is very scarce. The
question awaiting to be answered is: Can the same compensation strategies really be
universally effective or must they be customised to national culture and other con-
textual factors? Our reasoning is based on the premise that the dominant focus of the
theory and research in compensation management is based on the individualistic
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national culture of the United States and possibly cannot be applicable elsewhere
without caveat.
Not long ago, compensation practices in Croatia, an ex-Yugoslav society and EU
member since 2013, were limited to egalitarian pay structures with the traditional pay
system based on seniority. Such compensation system was similar to the compensa-
tion systems in other emerging countries, where most of these countries traditionally
based compensation on seniority, group membership, and equality concerns rather
than performance (Du & Nam Choi, 2010; Giacobbe-Miller, Miller, Zhang, &
Victorov, 2003). The implementation of the market economy accompanied with the
general development of HRM practices led to the applicability of Western-style com-
pensation practices in compensation management of Croatian companies as well. As
a critical part of the wage system revolution, one of the major changes was the initia-
tive to put more pay at risk through implementing variable pay. With the rapid con-
vergence and Americanisation in the application of compensation practices in Croatia
and other emerging markets, it is crucial to investigate the outcomes of
such practices.
The theory and research on compensation tends to be dominated by assumptions
and values originating from specific developed parts of the world, but can all existing
findings really be applicable in non-Western countries? This paper explores the out-
comes of using IVP in a non-Western setting by using Croatia as a case. Croatia is
not, originally, a capitalist country, but turned to a market economy only in the
1990s. Croatian national culture thus is characterised by collectivism, high power dis-
tance, femininity and high uncertainty avoidance, where all these features are quite
the opposite of the characteristics of the national culture of the U.S. (Hofstede, 1980).
In our investigation, we find lacking sufficient research on the issue of relationship
between variable pay and organisational outcomes in organisational settings within
collectivistic cultures. This paper addresses this gap by exploring the incidence of IVP
in Croatian companies and establishing a relationship between IVP and several
organisational aspects. For this purpose, an empirical examination of compensation
practices, employee behaviour-based indicators and organisational outcomes was con-
ducted among Croatian companies.
Following from the research problem presented above, a number of research ques-
tions can be identified:
 What kind of IVP systems are used in Croatia?
 Is the implementation of individual-based variable pay systems related to some
specific company characteristic?
 What results are achieved by using the IVP system in Croatia being a collectivis-
tic society?
2. Theoretical background
Culture, especially national culture, has been seen as a reflection of national history
influencing different aspects of the society as well as the minds and behaviour of
people (Moon & Choi, 2001). Therefore, it is necessary to understand that culture
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will have an impact on aspects of business as well. Although several models deal with
cultural differences (e.g., Trompenaars, 1993; Schwartz, 199), the contribution of
Hofstede in this respect is significant as his worldwide accepted research tries to
describe the nature of cultural characteristics within a society and compare countries
based on these characteristics. Hofstede (1980) defines culture as a patterned way of
thinking, feeling and reacting that differentiates members of one group from mem-
bers of other groups. It encompasses values, beliefs, and assumptions learned in
early childhood.
Hofstede’s model characterises culture in terms of six value dimensions, although
most available research considers only the four original dimensions: 1) power distance
(degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power
is distributed unequally), 2) individualism versus collectivism (a society’s position on
this dimension is reflected in whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or
“we”.), 3) masculinity versus femininity (in the business context masculinity versus fem-
ininity is sometimes also related to as “tough versus tender” cultures), 4) uncertainty
avoidance index (expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel uncom-
fortable with uncertainty and ambiguity) (Hofstede, 1980). The two dimensions added
later are 5) long-term orientation versus short-term normative orientation (in the busi-
ness context this dimension is related to as (short term) normative versus (long term)
pragmatic orientation) and 6) indulgence versus restraint. Hofstede (1980) suggested
that a society’s positioning on any given cultural dimension was associated with specific
work-related values (e.g., loyalty, achievement motivation, commitment, involvement,
and well-being) and organisational factors (e.g., degree of centralisation, organisational
structure, organisational type, and wage schemes) (Sama & Papamarcos, 2000).
In this paper we focus specifically on the role of individualism/collectivism in
designing reward strategies due to the fact that the findings that govern compensation
theory come almost exclusively from individualistic countries and mostly do not
Table 1. Country scores for individualism index.
United States 91 Lithuania 60 Bulgaria 30
United Kingdom 91 Poland 60 Mexico 30
Australia 90 Malta 59 Romania 30
Netherlands 80 Czech Republic 58 Portugal 27
Canada 80 Austria 55 Slovenia 27
Hungary 80 Slovak Republic 52 Malaysia 26
New Zealand 79 Spain 51 Hong Kong SAR 25
Italy 76 India 48 Serbia 25
Belgium 75 Japan 46 Chile 23
Denmark 74 Morocco 46 Singapore 20
Sweden 71 Argentina 46 China 20
France 71 Iran, Islamic Rep. 41 Thailand 20
Ireland 70 Russian Federation 39 Vietnam 20
Latvia 70 Qatar 38 Bangladesh 20
Norway 69 United Arab Emirates 38 El Salvador 19
Switzerland 68 Brazil 38 Korea, Rep. 18
Germany 67 Turkey 37 Peru 16
South Africa 65 Uruguay 36 Trinidad and Tobago 16
Finland 63 Greece 35 Indonesia 14
Luxembourg 60 Croatia 33 Pakistan 14
Estonia 60 Philippines 32 Colombia 13
Venezuela 12
Source: Hofstede (1980).
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acknowledge this as a study limitation. Furthermore, individualism is usually the
most replicated value in cultural research (Newman & Nollen, 1996). Individualism
reflects the degree to which people in a given society value independence versus
group membership. Countries that are high on individualism dimension emphasise
personal goals and autonomy whereas in countries with low individualism (high col-
lectivism) values centre around groups or families such as loyalty to the group, com-
mitment to group norms and involvement in group activities. A complete list of
society scores for individualism index can be seen in Table 1.
Countries whose individualism index has a value under 50 are characterised as
collectivistic countries. In these societies there is a preference for a tightly-knit
framework in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular
in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. Value over 50
indicates emphasised individualism which is characterised with a preference for a
loosely-knit social framework where individuals are expected to take care of only
themselves. At least 70% of the world’s population is socialised in collectivistic cul-
tures so the interplay between individualism and collectivism should receive sufficient
attention (Gully, Phillips, & Tarique, 2003).
Several authors emphasised that culture should be taken into account when design-
ing compensation strategies (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne,
1991; Luthans, Marsnik, & Luthans, 1997; Newman & Nollen, 1996; Townsend, Scott,
& Markham, 1990). Compensation strategies that have the highest potential to
achieve congruence with the prevailing value system differ depending upon the level
of individualism in a society, as shown in Figure 1. As argued by Gomez-Mejia and
 Dominant values Corporate features Compensation strategies 
High 
individualism 
• Personal accomplishment 
• Selfishness 
• Independence 
• Individual attributions 
• Internal locus of control 
• Belief in creating one’s own 
destiny 
• Utilitarian relationship with the 
employee 
• Organizations not compelled to 
care for employee’s total well 
being 
• Employees look after their 
individual interests 
• Explicit systems of control 
necessary to ensure compliance 
and prevent wide deviation from 
organizational norms 
• Performance based-pay 
• Individual achievement 
rewarded 
• External equity emphasized 
• Extrinsic rewards are 
important indicators of 
personal success 
• Attempts made to isolate 
individual contributions 




• Team accomplishment 
• Sacrifice for others 
• Dependence on social unit 
• Group attributions 
• External locus of control 
• Belief in the hand of fate 
• Moral relationship 
• Organizations committed to 
high level of involvement in 
worker’s personal lives 
• Loyalty to the firm is critical 
• Normative rather than formal 
systems of control to ensure 
compliance 
• Group based performance is 
important criteria 
• Seniority based pay utilized 
• Intrinsic rewards are essential 
• Internal equity is key in 
guiding pay policies 
• Personal need (e.g. number of 
children) affects pay received 
Figure 1. Individualism vs. collectivism and compensation.
Source: Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1991).
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Welbourne (1991), firms that achieve higher fit among the two have the higher
potential to be successful.
In collectivistic societies, there are tightly knit social networks in which individuals
are integrated into (clan, work team, organisation, community, society). People expect
their in-groups to look after them in exchange for absolute loyalty to the group.
Employees with collectivistic orientation are, therefore, less concerned with individual
standing or the amount that each individual receives than members of individualistic
cultures. In terms of reward management, such countries will opt for those types of
remuneration that are instrumental for group harmony and cohesiveness, avoiding
differentiation of rewards (Kim, Park, & Suzuki, 1990). Group-based responsibility
and action are consistent with the values in such cultures (Schuler & Rogovsky,
1998). Collectivistic countries emphasise equality or need as the guiding idea of the
reward management since any form of differentiated rewards would contradict the
fundamental objective of maintaining harmonious relationships or helping the needy
(Sama & Papamarcos, 2000). For example, Latin countries and southern European
countries, all traditionally collectivistic societies, put more emphasis on job security
and fringe benefits as compared to the rest of the world (Sirota & Greenwood, 1971
after Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004). In collectivistic cultures group or team incentives
are preferred over individual ones (Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998). In case individual
incentives are applied, seniority and skills are preferred as the starting point for deter-
mining them (Bogicevic Milikic & Janicijevic, 2009).
Individualists, relative to collectivists, may consider rewards as a driver of product-
ive work. Such societies are likely to make widespread use of individual performance-
based contingent rewards and high performers are more likely to receive relatively
greater rewards (Jackson & Schuler, 1995; Sama & Papamarcos, 2000; Schuler &
Rogovsky, 1998). For example, the research performed by Tosi and Greckhamer
(2004) confirmed that the ratio of variable pay to total pay among CEOs was related
to individualism. Nevertheless, it has been found that employee attitudes toward
incentive pay practices vary significantly across countries (de Waal & Jansen, 2013).
Existing theoretical and empirical results suggest that implementing IVP in a soci-
ety that is highly collectivistic is contrary to their normative values and may even
reduce employee performance in that cultural context (Chang & Hahn, 2006;
Newman & Nollen, 1996). Pay for performance in a collectivistic society has been
reported to be a source of negative outcomes such as dissatisfaction and high turn-
over intent, possibly owing to inappropriate goal-setting and unfair performance
appraisal processes (Dowling & Richardson, 1997; Miller, Hom, & Gomez-Mejia,
2001) but also lower organisational commitment and interpersonal helping at the
organisation (Du & Nam Choi, 2010). Research indicates that incentive schemes are
in countries like Croatia used at a lower rate than among Western countries (e.g., for
Serbia see Milikic, Janicijevic, & Petkovic, 2008). However, some research results do
indicate that the reactions to performance related pay can be positive (e.g., Chang &
Hahn, 2006 in Korea). It is worth mentioning that group allocation schemes consist-
ent with collectivistic values such as profit-sharing have been found to reduce
employee turnover in the collectivistic research setting (Miller, Hom, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2001).
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Performance evaluation, as one of the requirements for pay for performance, is
also influenced by national culture (Seddon, 1987; Brown, 1996 after Schuler &
Rogovsky, 1998; Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998; Peretz & Fried, 2012 ). Individualism is
compatible with the developed and formalised performance evaluation based on
evaluation of individual performance. However, it is believed that explicit and public
evaluation of individual achievement could harm a group’s harmony, and therefore it
is not well accepted or is even strongly resented within collectivistic societies.
Performance appraisal systems developed in “individualistic” societies, when applied
in collectivistic cultures, can cause unintended offence, or can even be incorrectly
employed (Seddon, 1987). Organisations in collectivistic societies are more likely to
use performance evaluation systems that focus on organisational purposes (e.g.,
human resource planning, identification of needs for training and development etc.)
unlike organisations in individualistic societies that use it as the basis to differentiate
among employees according to their performance policies (e.g., merit raises and indi-
vidual career development paths) (Peretz & Fried, 2012).
Research performed in a collectivistic society found dissatisfaction of both
employees and managers with their performance evaluation schemes (Bogicevic
Milikic & Janicijevic, 2009). Moreover, cultural dimensions can explain why per-
formance evaluation schemes are obstructed in collectivistic societies by the fact
that raters inflate their ratings in order to avoid feedback interviews and to avoid
confrontation with their subordinates (Bogicevic Milikic & Janicijevic, 2009).
Allocators higher in collectivism were found to give significantly larger merit rises
to low-performing subordinates than did more individualistic allocators (Gully,
Phillips, & Tarique, 2003).
General worker preferences in motivational techniques vary and may be also
explained by cultural differences (Sirota & Greenwood, 1971 after Tosi &
Greckhamer, 2004). Hofstede (1983) argues that in individualistic countries the
highest motivation is supposed to stem from the individuals’ need to fulfil their
obligations towards themselves. In a more collectivistic society, however, people will
try primarily to fulfil their obligations towards their in-group: family, enterprise or
their society. In terms of compensation, Luthans, Marsnik, and Luthans (1997) sug-
gest that recognition and praise should be used as motivators in collectivistic soci-
eties, but also that pay for performance should be avoided or used with caution in
these societies.
Research suggests that culture, based on Hofstede’s (1980) cultural model, can
influence what is perceived as a fair pay allocation system (Sama & Papamarcos,
2000; Fischer & Smith, 2003). Allocating rewards in a systematic manner is crucial to
ensure that employees perceive pay decisions as fair and equitable (Fischer & Smith,
2003). Empirical research on reward allocation preferences mostly confirms Gomez-
Mejia and Welbourne (1991) suggestions on the design of compensation strategies in
order to fit the cultural features. In countries whose cultures have been identified as
individualistic, employees exhibited a strong preference for equity in compensation,
when compared to countries that are more collectivistic. The equity norm dictates
that rewards should be divided in proportion to recipients’ input or contribution and
thus based on individual performance whereas the equality norm divides rewards
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equally to all members irrespective of contribution. In relatively collectivistic societies
equality among members is emphasised over equity based on individual effort (He,
Chen, & Zhang, 2004; Kim, Park, & Suzuki, 1990; Leung & Bond, 1984; Sama &
Papamarcos, 2000). Interestingly, in reward allocation individualists follow equity
regardless of the group membership of their interaction partner, whereas collectivists
are more likely to use equality when interacting with an in-group member but to
allocate rewards equitably with outgroup members even more strongly than would
individualists (Leung & Bond, 1984; James, 1993 after Fischer & Smith, 2003; Chen,
Meindl, & Hui, 1998).
Some studies did not find any support for a moderating effect of national culture
as a determinant for a preference for a certain type of allocation scheme (Kuhn,
2009). It might suggest that it is really individual and situational factors that cause
differences in employee reactions or that individual, contextual and organisational
factors have a greater influence on the values governing reward allocation decisions
than the prevailing culture norms (Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003; Lam et al., 2002).
3. Empirical research
This section is organised as follows: first, a detailed explanation of research method-
ology and research instrument is provided. Sampling procedure as well as sample
characteristics is described in the same section. Secondly, general findings about pres-
ence of various individual incentives with regard to employee categories, as well as
specific findings about association with outcomes expected from implementing these
types of direct rewards are presented; and finally, research limitations and recommen-
dations for future research are mentioned at the end of the section.
3.1. Research methodology
3.1.1. Research instrument
A questionnaire containing 46 questions was designed for the purpose of primary
data collection. A majority of key questions about different reward management strat-
egies were found or adapted in different journal articles as well as the Chartered
Institute for Personnel Development internal materials. The allotted time for filling the
questionnaire was approximately 30 to 45minutes.
3.1.2. Measures
For the purpose of this research, one independent variable was used: the presence of
individual variable pay which contained several variable pay subcategories (both sub-
jectively and objectively-assessed practices) and were treated as binary variables.
Respondents were asked to provide information on whether each variable pay
practice existed in their organisations or not for three different categories of employ-
ees – managers, experts and other employees. On the other hand, other variables
of interest that were related to various attitudes, behaviour-based indicators or organ-
isational outcomes were of either nominal or continuous character. More precisely,
organisational climate was assessed by an HR manager on a Likert-type 5-point scale
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(1 ¼ very unpleasant and with high degree of tensions among employees, 5 ¼ very
pleasant and without tensions among employees). Additionally, organisational
outcomes in terms of productivity in the last three years as well as productivity
compared to competitors was assessed on Likert-type 5-point scale as well (e.g., 1 –
considerably lower than the industry average, 5 – well above the industry average).
Problems in attracting, retaining and engaging employees were ranked for different
categories of employees (1 – without problems, 2 – some problems, 3 – considerable
problems). Finally, information on attrition and absenteeism rates was provided by
selecting one of the five different options (1, designated rates up to 5% while 5 was
the highest level of the same indicator). Control variables were designed almost exclu-
sively as closed-ended questions, such as ownership type, profitability in the last three
years and legal form of the company. Several open-ended questions were present as
well (e.g., year of establishment, industry, number of employees).
3.1.3. Sample
The first step in designing our research was to select participants for the empirical
research. As this research is part of a larger project funded by the Croatian Science
Foundation that aims at covering an entire population of Croatian companies, the
emphasis was on large and medium-sized companies as those are expected to have
more sophisticated HRM practices in general (Kotey & Sheridan 2004), and reward
practices in specific. The number of Croatian companies (excluding banking and
finance sectors) that employ more than 100 employees was obtained through the
Croatian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) where it was revealed that approximately
1700 companies in Croatia employ more than 100 people, out of which 386 compa-
nies employ more than 250 people (labelled as “large companies”).
3.1.4. Data collection and analysis
An e-mail with covering letter from the Project leader was sent to HR departments of
all companies in the CCC database in April 2017. Reminders were sent out in May
and June, followed by personal reminders to HR managers of different project mem-
bers using professional networks. The primary data was collected from 58 companies.
As the data collection phase was concluded a statistical analysis of the primary data
with IBM SPSS 20.0 followed. Apart from descriptive statistics, inferential statistical
methods were applied in the case of analysing differences in applying variable indi-
vidual pay practices in different contexts (Chi-square test) and in the case of examin-
ing their relationship with organisational and behaviour outcomes (Mann-Whitney
U-test and Chi square test). The independent characteristics of the companies in the
sample are given in a summary table below (Table 2).
As can be seen from Table 2, both manufacturing and service companies are
almost equally represented in the sample (N¼ 30 and N¼ 28, respectively), as are
companies that employ less than 250 (50%) and more than 250 (50%) people, as well
as those founded after (55%) and before (45%) the dissolution of the Yugoslav
Republic. Regarding ownership structure, more than half of the sample is comprised
of private domestic companies, one-third are privately-owned foreign companies,
while state-owned and companies with mixed ownership are underrepresented in the
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sample (12% combined). Limited liability companies form a majority (65.50%), while
apart from joint stock companies (34.50%) there is no other type of company legal
form represented in the sample. With regard to self-reported profitability in the last
five years, 71% of the companies reported being profitable, one-quarter of them were
around or below average, while less than 4% reported they were not profitable.
3.2. Research results
The first step in analysing data was exploring the prevalence of individual incentives
in general and with regard to different employee categories, i.e., managers, experts
and other employees. The results are shown in Table 3. As can be seen from the
table, performance appraisal can be found in half of sampled companies for all three
employee categories. Norm measurement, on the other hand, is only sporadically
found while the prevalence of occasional bonuses based on the evaluation of a direct
superior decreases from managers to other employees. None of the individual incen-
tives was applied in one-third of companies in the case of “other employees”, as well
as in 28.60% for experts. Since performance appraisal is central to high performing
work practices, it was interesting to reveal that 75% of organisations are applying this
practice for at least one category of employees.
Next, we were interested to explore characteristics of companies that apply individ-
ual incentives more frequently, i.e., to analyse their prevalence among different sam-
ple sub-groups as well as to test differences among sample characteristics and
whether those incentives were applied or not (dummy variable). For the purpose of
testing the differences in applying individual variable pay practices in different sample
subgroups a Chi-square test was used. Results are shown in Table 4.
Generally, individual variable incentives or performance-related pay in general
seems to be present in the majority of Croatian companies. At the level of individual
company characteristics, not many differences were revealed. More precisely, com-
pany profitability in the last five years does seem to make a difference with respect to
applying individual performance appraisal where companies that reported being prof-
itable use individual performance appraisal for at least one category of employees
more frequently (p¼ 0.062).
Table 2. Data distribution by sample characteristics.
Company characteristic Data distribution
Industry Manufacturing – 51.70%
Services – 48.30%
Year of establishment Before 1990 – 45.60%
After 1990 – 54.40%
Number of employees Less than 250 – 50.00%
More than 250 – 50.00%
Ownership structure Private domestic – 55.20%
Private foreign – 32.80%
State-owned and mixed – 12.00%
Legal form Joint stock company – 34.50%
Limited liability company – 65.50%
Profitability in the last 5 years Cannot assess – 1.70%
Unprofitable – 3.40%
Around or below average – 24.10%
Profitable – 70.70%
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With regard to specific individual pay-for-performance practices, major differences
were found with respect to the size and ownership structure of the company. More
precisely, larger companies, i.e., those employing more 250 people more often apply
individual performance appraisal for managers (p¼ 0.065) and experts (p¼ 0.004) as
well as norm measurement for other employees (p¼ 0.085). Smaller companies, how-
ever, seem to apply more occasional bonuses for experts (p¼ 0.023). Private domestic
companies are more likely to apply occasional bonuses for all three categories of
employees. With regard to establishment or company age, norm measurement for
experts can be found more frequently in older companies (p¼ 0.052). Industry
revealed a difference in applying norm measurement in manufacturing (p¼ 0.088) as
well as sales commission in services (p¼ 0.071), which is an expected result. With
respect to legal form, sales commissions for experts (p¼ 0.049) as well as occasional
bonuses for other employees (p¼ 0.049) were more frequently applied in limited
liability companies. With regard to profitability in the last five years, the only differ-
ence was found in applying non-financial recognition which was more frequently
found in less successful companies (p¼ 0.057).
Finally, we were interested in finding out whether there were any differences in
motivational and organisational outcomes between companies that apply and do not
apply IVP. Outcomes that were chosen for this research were: organisational climate,
productivity compared to competitors, increase of productivity in the last three years,
problems with attracting, retaining and engaging employees and, finally, rates of
absenteeism and attrition. For the purpose of testing the relationships between apply-
ing individual variable pay practices and organisational climate and productivity,a
Mann-Whitney U-test was used. On the other hand, a Chi square test was applied in
order to test the relationship between individual variable pay and other behaviour-
based indicators (attrition and absenteeism rates, problems in attracting, retaining
and engaging employees). Differences are shown in Table 5.
At the level of descriptive statistics, organisational climate was found to be slightly
more positive in companies that apply individual performance appraisal for at least
one group of employees (x̄ ¼ 3.88). Additionally, companies that apply individual
performance appraisal compared their productivity relative to those of competitors
much higher (x̄ ¼ 3.72) than companies without this practice (x̄ ¼ 3.26), which was
also confirmed by a non-parametric test (p¼ 0.072). The assessment of the productiv-
ity rise in the last three years was found to be higher in the case of companies that
do apply individual performance appraisal, both at the level of descriptive (x̄ ¼ 3.88
Table 3. The prevalence of individual incentives (II) with regard to different employee categories.
Type of individual incentive (II)
% of companies applying II for different categories
of employees
Managers Experts Other employees
Norm measurement 0.00 5.20 10.30
Performance appraisal 53.40 50.00 48.30
Occasional bonuses based on superior’s evaluation 44.80 31.00 24.10
Sales commission 22.40 19.00 19.00
Individual non-financial recognition 37.90 20.70 15.50
None of the above 13.80 27.60 31.00
Individual performance appraisal in general 74.10








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1366 I. NACINOVIC BRAJE ET AL.
compared to x̄ ¼ 3.46) and inferential (p¼ 0.062) statistics. The analysis of each IVP
practice for each category of employees revealed that productivity in the last three
years was found to be statistically significantly higher in companies that do apply
non-financial recognition for managers (p¼ 0.060) and norm measurement for both
experts (p¼ 0.056) and other employees (p¼ 0.026). On the other hand, norm meas-
urement and performance appraisal were found to be negatively related to organisa-
tional climate (p¼ 0.052) and relative productivity (p¼ 0.082) in the case of
other employees.
Finally, behavioural outcomes such as attracting, retaining and engaging employees
generally pointed towards positive figures, i.e., no substantive problems in what is
often cited as the general aim of a reward system. A more detailed analysis detected
several statistically significant differences in the relationship between various individ-
ual variable pay practices and behavioural outcomes. More precisely, fewer problems
with attracting employees were observed in companies that do apply non-financial
recognition for managers (p¼ 0.078) and occasional bonuses for experts (p¼ 0.056).
Similarly, fewer problems with employee engagement were detected among compa-
nies that apply performance appraisal for both managers (p¼ 0.036) and experts
(p¼ 0.092). As for absenteeism and attrition rates, it was revealed that higher rates of
attrition were significantly related to the existence of norm measurement for both
experts (p¼ 0.000) and other employees (p¼ 0.021).
4. Discussion
In this paper we have explored the role of individual incentives in a collectivistic soci-
ety. Our first finding based on a recent research is that managers in 13.8% sampled
Croatian companies do not have any form of individual incentives. Among expert-
level employees, a high percentage of 27.6% of organisations do not have any form of
IVP while 31% of all companies do not offer any form of variable pay to other (oper-
ational level) employees. Such results are mostly consistent with previous research
results on this topic. The implementation of incentive compensation in Croatian
companies was strongly encouraged by foreign-owned companies that transferred
their home-society practices to subsidiaries operating in Croatia. Other private com-
panies mostly followed this trend and we find that this rate of use is a reflection of
ownership structure of sampled companies. This is because the state-owned compa-
nies in Croatia in most cases have not implemented the system of variable pay,
although there are constant initiatives to implement performance based pay to all
public services. Although Hofestede’s work argues that individual performance based
incentives will be more prevalent in individualistic verses collectivist cultures, we did
not find that individual incentives are neglected in Croatia due to its collectivistic
national culture.
Performance appraisal is the most often applied tool for determining variable pay.
In general, 74% of all examined companies use it for at least some employee groups.
Such result is expected since performance appraisal has other important functions in
the context of human resource management (training and development, career plan-
ning, performance feedback, etc.). There are some suggestions that a performance
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appraisal process can be obstructed in collectivistic countries since it can harm
groups’ harmony. Our research did not find any statistically significant difference in
organisational climate among companies that apply individual performance appraisal
and those who do not apply it. Furthermore, the research confirmed that it can be
beneficial for productivity since there is a statistically significant difference in prod-
uctivity compared to competitors between companies that do/do not apply individual
performance appraisal. Similarly, statistically significant difference has been found
with respect to growth in productivity in the past three years.
The evaluation of performance appraisal in terms of employee behavioural out-
comes such as ease of attracting, retaining and engaging employees revealed lack of
any beneficial effect of performance appraisal when comparing companies that apply
and do not apply individual performance appraisal. Such finding is relatively consist-
ent with attributes of collectivistic societies. This is because employees might avoid
companies that apply such evaluation. On the other hand, due to the reverse applica-
tion of the sorting rule, those companies that do not apply performance appraisal
might also have a large pool of interested job candidates. Nevertheless, it has been
found that problems with attracting managers were more frequently observed in com-
panies that do apply performance appraisal. Since managers’ performance is relatively
often assessed and pay for performance for managers is strongly supported in the
compensation theory this finding is difficult to explain. If we examine this finding
from a cultural perspective, the probable reason for the finding could be the fact that
managers in Croatia traditionally received only fixed pay. Furthermore, they had a
high level of job security and received additional benefits. It might be that some man-
agers still prefer such companies that offer job security over performance based pay.
5. Conclusions
The starting point for this paper is the question whether incentive compensation
practices that are widely discussed and suggested are really effective in collectivistic
societies? The motivational aspect of incentive compensation within human resource
management (HRM) theory is well documented. However, the literature has failed to
provide a clear idea of how employees that do not share national culture values with
highly individualistic Western employees react to IVP and the outcomes achieved for
organisations in these countries. This paper tackled the issue by exploring organisa-
tional outcomes of implementing different forms of variable pay by taking Croatia, a
society whose national culture features measured by Hofestede’s cultural metrics score
are very different from U.S. values. To be more precise, Croatian national culture is
defined by a fairly high level of collectivism which differentiates it from most Anglo-
Saxon countries. Regarding compensation management, the literature on national cul-
ture models is implicitly prescriptive; it dictates that compensation and reward poli-
cies must be developed to align with and to reinforce national cultural attributes
(Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991; Hofstede, 1983). The
result of such prescription would be putting emphasis on the use of group incentives
relative to individual incentives in collectivistic societies. However, due to popularity
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of the IVP, it is also critical to understand in which way will companies benefit from
using this form of variable pay.
We acknowledge that people may be committed to smaller groups than “nation”
who have distinct subcultures, for example organisational cultures, so national culture
might not have the prevailing impact on shaping compensation strategies (Bloom &
Milkovich, 1998). Also, national culture is just one of the many factors that define
reward strategies and pay systems. Our intention in this paper had been to show ben-
efits and drawbacks of using IVP in a collectivistic society. The research aimed at
answering the following research questions: what kind of IVP systems are offered in
collectivistic societies, is the implementation of IVP systems related to some specific
company characteristic and what results can companies achieve by using IVP systems.
Research results indicate that the IVP system is frequently used in collectivistic soci-
eties, which confirms the thesis of global convergence of compensation strategies.
Individual performance evaluation is the most often used basis for determining vari-
able pay which is consistent with expectations. The rate of use of individual pay for
performance practices is dependent upon company profitability, size and ownership.
IVP does have some positive effects on the productivity as well, although it does not
have benefits for the behavioural outcomes such as attracting, engaging and retaining
employees. Despite some expectations that equality should be emphasised over equity
within collectivistic societies, this paper shows that companies in collectivistic soci-
eties do exploit some benefits from using IVP. Therefore, collectivistic values should
not prevent companies from using IVP. Nevertheless, human resource managers
must be aware of numerous drawbacks of IVP in collectivistic societies described
throughout this paper: employee dissatisfaction, turnover intent, lower organisational
commitment or perceptions of fairness.
5.1. Research limitations and recommendations for future research
The main limitation of this research is the cross-sectionality of data. Thus, future
research should aim at gathering longitudinal data in order to establish causal rela-
tions among different variables. Additionally, the sample consists of only 58 compa-
nies, so representativeness might be lower than was initially aimed for. In future,
scholars should try to cover a higher percentage of companies in order to be able to
generalise research findings. Finally, the questionnaire was filled out by one person
only, i.e., the HR manager, which implies a response bias. Certain steps were taken,
however, in order to minimise the effects of single-method bias: respondents were
guaranteed anonymity to increase the accuracy of the responses; criterion measures
were placed in different sections of the questionnaire from predictor variables; the
expertise of our respondents could be deemed unquestionable, as they were members
of the corporate HR team. In future, the questionnaire could be distributed personally
and be followed by an interview. Finally, additional, independent data could be
impaired with data gathered by cross-sectional research, i.e., financial indicators from
public reports which would add more strength to findings and avoid response bias in
questions that referred to financial and organisational performance of companies in
the sample.
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